

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 097208

O R 031414Z NOV 74 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0724

INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 5065

EXDIS SECTO 399

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TALKS WITH AFGHAN LEADERS

1. SUMMARY: SECRETARY'S SIX HOUR VISIT TO KABUL INCLUDED HOUR'S TALK WITH NAIM AND LONGER TALK AND LUNCHEON WIT DAOUD. EMPHASIS IN AFGHAN PRESENTATION IN BOTH SESSIONS WAS ON GOA POSITION ON PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE, WITH BOTH LEADERS INSISTING THEY WANTED PEACEFUL SOLUTION BECAUSE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT. GOA WILLING TO TALK ANYWHERE, ANYTIME WITHOUT PRE-CONDISTIONS. BOTH STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF US PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN; NAIM URGED US TO ACCELERATE AND DEEPEN SUPPORT FOR HELMAND DEVELOPMENT. DESPITE SECRETARY'S REPEATED PROBING AS TO PRECISELY WHAT AFGHANS WANTED FROM PAKISTAN, HE WAS UNABLE TO GET ANYTHING MORE SPECIFIC THAN THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD TREAT PUSHTUNS AND BALUCHIS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF PAK CONSTITUTION. SECRETARY STRESSED US UNDERSTANDING FOR AFGHAN NONALIGNED POLICY, OUR INTENTION MAINTAIN US PRESENCE, THE HIGH IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO PEACE IN AREA, AND OUR SUPPORT FOR PAK INTEGRITY. SAID HE WOULD

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ASK SENIOR AID OFFICIAL TO VISIT KABUL WITHIN NEXT SEVERAL

WEEKS TO REVIEW AID PROGRAMS FOR FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

2. AFGHAN PRESENTATION TO SECRETARY INCLUDED FAIRLY DETAILED REVIEW OF US/AFGHAN RELATIONS AND AFGHAN FOREIGN POLICY BY NAIM, FOLLOWED BY SUBSEQUENT BROAD-BRUSH OVERVIEW BY PRESIDENT DAOUD. DAOUD EMPHASIZED PRIORITY HE ATTACHED TO DEVELOPMENT WHICH HE SAID COULD ONLY PROCEED IN ATMOSPHERE OF PEACE. THEREFORE THERE WAS "NO DESIRE TO GET INVOLVED" IN ANYTHING IN AREA THAT WOULD FURTHER DEEPEN ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS AND SLOW VITAL PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT. HE HOPED US WOULD CONTINUE TO ASSIST DEVELOPMENT EFFORT, BUT IF US CHOSE NOT TO DO SO THIS WOULD NEVER AFFECT BASICALLY CORDIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD US.

3. DAOUD TOLD SECRETARY THAT REASON HE ACTED TO REMOVE MONARCHY WAS THE "DISINTEGRATION" OF INTERNAL SITUATION, PARTICULARLY GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION, PLUS BREAKDOWN OF MORAL VALUES.

4. DAOUD TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE POINT "MOST SERIOUSLY" TO SECRETARY THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD ACCEPTED NO FOREIGN IDEOLOGY AND WAS NOT UNDER ANY FOREIGN OR ALIEN INFLUENCE. US SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBTS ON THIS SCORE.

5. ON PAKISTAN/AFGHAN RELATIONS, BOTH AFGHAN LEADERS AVOIDED BEING PINNED DOWN WHEN PRESSED AS TO EXACTLY WHAT AFGHANISTAN WANTED OF PAKISTAN. DAOUD KEPT HIS RESPONSE TO OBSERVATION THAT AFGHANISTAN WANTED GOA TO WORK OUT POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT WITH PUSHTUNS AND

BALUCHI PEOPLE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM AND THAT IF THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THEM IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO AFGHANS, SO LONG AS THIS BASED ON JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS. HE SAID THAT AFGHAN PEOPLE, BECAUSE OF LONG HISTORICAL AND ETHNIC TIES WITH PUSHTUNS AND BALUCHIS, COULD NOT IGNORE THE FEELINGS AND WELFARE OF THESE PEOPLE. IF BHUTTO WANTED TALK OR NEGOTIATE WITH GOA, CONFIDENTIAL

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LATTER IS READY TO DO SO. BUT IF PAKISTAN WANTED TO SOLVE PROBLEM WITH FORCE, BOMBING, IMPRISONMENT OF BALUCHIS AND PUSHTUNS, THEN GOA COULD NOT REMAIN IN-DIFFERENT.

6. IN HIS PRESENTATION NAIM MADE EXPLICIT GOA'S BELIEF THAT BECAUSE OF AFGHAN GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION, US PRESENCE WAS A DESIRABLE THING WHICH GOA WISHED TO

SEE CONTINUE. NAIM ALSO EXPRESSED HOPE US DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE WOULD CONTINUE AND URGED US TO ACCELERATE SUPPORT FOR HELMAND VALLEY PROJECT IN WAYS WHICH WOULD PERMIT IT TO BE COMPLETED OVER NEXT DECADE. HE EMPHASIZED CONTRIBUTION IT MAKING ON FOOD FRONT AT TIME OF WORLD FOOD CRISIS.

7. IN FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW, NAIM NOTED CLOSE AND CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE A FACTOR FOR STABILITY IN THIS PART OF ASIA. HE ALSO HIGHLIGHTED CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA AND SAID THAT AFGHANISTAN FELT SECURE IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND EMPHASIZED THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP INCLUDED NO IDEOLOGICAL INTERFERENCE. THIS SAME POINT MADE BY DAOUD.

8. NAIM SAID AFGHANISTAN HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIM WHATSOEVER ON PAKISTAN AND WOULD NEVER BE CONSIDERED AS AGGRESSOR. ALL AFGHANISTAN ASKED WAS THAT PAKISTAN AVOID CREATING DISSENSION AMONG ITS OWN PEOPLES SO AS TO PREVENT CREATION OF TENSION AND HATRED AMONG AFGHANS WHO INEVITABLY AFFECTED BY OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES OF PUSHTUNS AND BALUCHIS. AFGHAN GOVERNMENT COULD NEVER REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO WELFARE OF THESE PEOPLE. NAIM SAID GOA READY TO TALK WITH PAKS AT ANYTIME OR PLACE AND WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS.

9. WITH BOTH NAIM AND DAOUD, SECRETARY STRESSED HIS CONFIDENCE THAT AFGHANISTAN WOULD CONTINUE ITS INDEPENDENT AND NONALIGNED FOREIGN POLICY, A POLICY WITH ROOTS IN AFGHAN HISTORY AND WITH WHICH WE HAD NO DIFFICULTY. HE THOUGHT THAT RECORD OF DAOUD'S REGIME WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT DAOUD CONTINUED SUCCESSFULLY

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TO FOLLOW TRADITIONAL AFGHAN POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE AND NONALIGNMENT. SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT US FULLY APPRECIATED AFGHAN NEED AND DESIRE TO HAVE CLOSE AND GOOD RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION. SECRETARY NOTED, HOWEVER, WHAT HE FELT WAS EVOLVING BLOC PHILOSOPHY AMONG NON-ALIGNED WHICH IF CONTINUED COULD RESULT IN DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION WITH DEVELOPED WORLD AND WHICH IN LONG RUN COULD ONLY HURT LDC'S THEMSELVES. HE WAS NOT DIRECTING CRITICISM AGAINST AFGHANISTAN BUT DID HOPE GOA WOULD KEEP THIS PROBLEM IN MIND IN CONTACTS WITH OTHER NON-ALIGNED STATES.

10. SECRETARY SAID USG UNDERSTOOD WHY AFGHANISTAN DESIRED US PRESENCE, AND AFFIRMED THAT US WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENCE IN AID AND OTHER WAYS

WITHIN CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE TO IT. AS FOR HELMAND VALLEY, HE TOLD BOTH NAIM AND DAOUD THAT HE WOULD ASK SENIOR AID OFFICIAL TO COME TO AFGHANISTAN WITHIN NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS TO REVIEW SITUATION WITH AFGHANS WITH A VIEW TO DEVELOPING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS OF A KIND THAT AFGHANS THEMSELVES FELT MIGHT BE USEFUL. SECRETARY CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT ATTITUDES IN CONGRESS TOWARD AID GENERALLY WERE NOT GOOD AND THAT THEREFORE HE COULD GIVE NO ASSURANCES AS TO EXTENT OF USG ASSISTANCE.

11. ON PAKISTAN/AFGHAN RELATIONS, SECRETARY INDICATED SOME DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING EXACTLY WHAT AFGHANS WISHED OF PAKISTAN WITH RESPECT TO BALUCHI AND PUSHTUN PEOPLES. HE REMINDED AFGHANS OF LONG TRADITION OF CLOSE US/PAKISTAN TIES AND OF OUR DESIRE THAT PAKISTAN'S INTEGRITY BE MAINTAINED. ANY TERRITORIAL CHANGE SEEMED IMPOSSIBLE SHORT OF WAR AND THIS WOULD HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR GENERAL PEACE AND STABILITY OF AREA AS A WHOLE. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR AFGHAN ASSURANCE THAT THEY TOO WG83\$ 59 33 043 ERVATION OF PAKISTAN'S INTEGRITY AND WERE PREPARED TO SEEK PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM. SECRETARY SAID HE HAD TALKED WITH BHUTTO DURING CURRENT TRIP ON THIS SUBJECT AND HAD URGED GOP TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. BHUTTO TOO SAID HE PREPARED

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FOR TALKS. SECRETARY TOLD BOTH NAIM AND DAOUD THAT USG WOULD ALWAYS BE READY TO CONSIDER HELPING IN STRENGTHENING PAK/AFGHAN RELATIONS, IF IN FACT THERE WAS SOMETHING SPECIFIC THAT AFGHANISTAN (AND PAKISTAN) THOUGHT USG COULD USEFULLY DO. NEITHER DAOUD NOR NAIM NDRESPONDED SPECIFICALLY, ALTHOUGH DAOUD EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT SINCE US WAS GOOD FRIEND OF BOTH COUNTRIES ITS GOOD OFFICES WOULD HELP BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THIS PART OF THE WORLD.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 NOV 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: SmithRJ
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974BUCHAR05065
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740315-0342
From: BUCHAREST
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741175/aaaacmaf.tel
Line Count: 212
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: SmithRJ
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 JUN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <04 JUN 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <21 MAR 2003 by SmithRJ>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY'S TALKS WITH AFGHAN LEADERS
TAGS: OVIP, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005